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China’s Cautious Participation in the 
UN Human Rights Regime 
 






A review of China, the United Nations, and Human 
Rights: The Limits of Compliance, by Ann Kent. 





When most Western students of human rights and/or international relations think of China, 
unfortunately they are most likely to think not of the greatness and longevity of Chinese civilization, 
the goodness of Chinese cuisine, or the grandesse of the Chinese landscape. Rather, they are most 
likely to think of the Tian’anmen Square incident of 1989 and China’s human rights problems. 
Considering both the interest and the emotion generated in the West over the issue of human rights 
in China, it is surprising that so little scholarly work has actually been done on the subject. There 
have been many journal articles published on it, and most books published on Sino-American 
relations or Chinese foreign policy have a chapter on the “human rights issue.” Besides the reports 
of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Human Rights in China, few in-depth studies 
have been done on China and human rights. Ann Kent's China, the United Nations, and Human 
Rights: The Limits of Compliance is remarkable in that it provides both an in-depth analysis of 
China’s human rights policy and its interaction with the various United Nations organs concerned 
with human rights, and an assessment of the UN human rights regime’s success in dealing with 
China in terms of policy-change and both de jure and de facto compliance. The study notes both 
progress and continued problems in China’s relationship with the UN human rights regime, and 
must be considered essential reading for anyone interested in and/or dealing with China in the area 
of human rights. For all of these reasons, and because it is so well written and researched, Ann 
Kent’s new book is a much-welcomed, much-needed addition to the study of human rights and 
China. 
A Brief History of China’s Interaction with the UN Human Rights Regime 
Under the banner of the Republic of China, China was a signatory to both the UN Charter and 
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, with the Chinese civil war, the 
communist victory on the mainland and the Nationalist flight to Taiwan (from where it represented 
China at the UN until it was unseated by the People’s Republic of China in 1971), mainland China 
was un-represented at the UN and therefore subscribed to none of the UN’s human rights regimes. 
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In 1971, the leaders of the People’s Republic of China reaffirmed their acceptance of the UN 
Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights by rejoining the UN. But as China was in the 
midst of the throes of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), it did not participate actively in the UN 
until the late 1970s. Subsequently, China has signed the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. China has 
yet to ratify the latter two, signed in 1997 and 1998 respectively. 
Allow me to begin with a discussion of China’s stand on human rights and a small point of 
contention with Kent. While the Chinese were involved in the drafting of both the UN Charter and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, she rightly notes they have not always been supporters 
of the Declaration’s universalism. Kent’s argument here is that China’s official policy has been to 
pay lip-service to universalism but to argue for cultural relativism, the notion that human rights are 
related to cultural norms and thus are not universal.1 She speaks of the human rights debate as 
coming down basically to two choices: cultural relativism or universalism (p. 20-25). While rightly 
rejecting the polarization of this debate, she does not acknowledge the existence of a third stand on 
human rights today, developmentalism.2 
The developmental view of human rights has been described by Michael Sullivan as an 
acceptance of universality (a de facto rejection of cultural relativism), with the stipulation that 
countries will only be able to attain the universal standard of human rights with a higher level of 
development.3 While the Chinese have at times certainly made cultural relativist arguments, Sullivan 
argues that China’s overall human rights policy has been developmentalist, that the Chinese argue 
that countries still in lower stages of development cannot “afford” the “luxury” of fully-
implemented universal human rights until later. Peter Van Ness agrees:  
China’s declaratory position on international human rights, importantly, is neither Marxist nor cultural-
relativist. Rather, Beijing takes ‘developmentalist’ exception to the immediate implementation of UN 
standards for less industrialized countries, and emphasizes the economic agenda over civil and political rights 
and group rights, especially self-determination, over individual rights.4  
Sullivan and Van Ness are correct. While Kent explicitly brands China’s 1993 Vienna statement 
and the 1991 White Paper as “cultural relativism,” the line she quotes from the White Paper to 
prove her point shows that China’s stance is in fact developmentalist: “...different historical stages 
had different human rights requirements.” (p. 182) “Historical stages” are more likely economic than 
cultural here. The assumption that historical stages means economic stages is more in line with 
China’s sometimes still somewhat Marxian inclinations as well. Developmentalism explains one 
thing Kent’s new book cannot - why China signs off on universalistic documents and then 
immediately argues against being held accountable for the implementation of universal standards of 
human rights. This is a small but important point.  
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China, the UN Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on the Prevention 
of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities 
The UN Commission on Human Rights, made up of a number of rotating UN member states, is 
the main UN body dealing with human rights and was established by the UN’s Economic and Social 
Council in 1946. Made up not of UN member states but of independent human rights experts, the 
UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities was 
created by the Commission to investigate human rights problems and report back to the 
Commission. Kent observes that after sending observers for three years, in 1981 China was elected a 
Commission member and from 1982 to the present has played an active role as a member, and 
would likely even have become chair of the 1990 commission had it not been for the violent 
crackdowns on demonstrators in 1989 (p. 56).  
In her analysis of China’s relations with the Commission and the Sub-Commission, Kent notes 
that these fora “offer, on the one hand, the clearest potential for public scrutiny of China’s human 
rights, and, on the other, the greatest susceptibility to lobbying, coalition building, and manipulation 
by powerful states.” (p. 79) It was after the events of 1989 that a truly confrontational environment 
arose between China and the Commission and Sub-Commission. In 1989 the Sub-Commission 
passed a resolution against China expressing concern about the events of June, 1989. In 1991 the 
Sub-Commission passed its own resolution expressing concern over China’s treatment of the 
Tibetan people and its long-term policies in Tibet (Kent, p. 58 and 63). Yet these have been the only 
two instances of resolutions against China for human rights problems in the histories of the 
Commission and Sub-Commission.  
According to Kent’s study, the reason for this is that China has been very effective in its 
lobbying effort in the two fora (p. 80-1). Kent has documented how Chinese representatives have 
routinely bilateralized these multilateral fora, threatening economic/trade retaliations against the 
home-countries of voting members (p. 76-81). They even threatened the Danish ambassador in the 
1997 meeting of the Commission, saying he “would regret” his decision to sponsor a resolution 
against China, and drawing up a list of Danish companies that would be excluded from 
consideration for future deals with/in China in the future if he did so (p. 97). Kent argues that 
China’s growing power and the increasing sophistication of its human rights diplomacy in recent 
years have brought it success in avoiding resolutions against it as it has sought to deal with members 
of the Commission and Sub-Commission on a bilateral basis, offering them both carrot and stick to 
vote China’s way.  
Kent’s conclusion to her study of China’s relations with the Commission and Sub-Commission 
on Human Rights is that, “[t]his case study demonstrates the difficulties of monitoring a large 
power, particularly in a noncrisis situation.” (p. 81) Because of China’s growing power and influence 
in the international community, and the long-term nature of its human rights problems, she believes 
countries wishing to hold China to greater levels of international accountability in the area of human 
rights can be more successful only by working together, seeking out multilateral consensus in these 
UN fora rather than choosing to deal with China bilaterally.  
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China and the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT)  
The CAT’s mandate is to set and uphold standards so that citizens of UN member nations are 
protected from torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
China acceded to the CAT in 1988, and from Kent's perspective, its relations with the CAT’s 
Committee are a story of both progress and stumbling blocks. China’s first report to the UN 
Committee that oversees the implementation of the convention, filed in December 1989, was not a 
great success. It was deemed too general by the NGOs and the Committee, and Chinese delegates 
were informed that they did not follow CAT procedures nor did they respond to each specific issue 
in the CAT guidelines. They were requested to file a supplementary report in time for the following 
year’s CAT meeting. The subsequent Chinese report was much more satisfactory to the Committee 
and specific progress was noted, particularly that legislation had been enacted to strengthen Chinese 
law to protect its citizens from torture. China refused the requests of the Committee, however, 
regarding the appointment of a Special Rapporteur to investigate certain allegations on site. Kent’s 
analysis of China’s continued interaction with the CAT reveals that in more recent meetings, China 
has continued this pattern: offering de jure acknowledgment of CAT provisions, coupled with de facto 
refusal to acknowledge China’s accountability to the CAT as it concerns issues it deems within the 
purview of national sovereignty.  
As Kent notes, one of the problems between China and the CAT Committee has been a 
difference in how torture is defined. The CAT defines torture as 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the 
instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating him or other persons. (p. 86)  
China’s Criminal Law contains two general conceptions of torture as Kent points out, “the first 
being to ‘coerce a statement’ (Art. 136), the second being to subject imprisoned people to corporal 
punishment and abuse for this purpose (Art. 189).” (p. 92) It does not include mental torture and/or 
intimidation, which are included in the CAT definition. So while Chinese law declares torture strictly 
illegal, the fact that the definition does not include mental torture and intimidation is one reason the 
NGOs still file so many complaints against China in this issue-area. 
Other reasons for the continued presence of torture in China according to Amnesty 
International are, “inadequate legislation, the practice of incommunicado detention as ‘the norm for 
most detainees,’ inadequate investigations, and a ‘climate of impunity.’” (Kent, p. 101) Moreover, the 
recent government pressure on local law enforcement agencies to curb the burgeoning crime rate 
and the traditional importance in China placed upon getting confessions out of suspects, together 
with the above factors, give law enforcement officials too many incentives to use torture even where 
it is illegal. Unfortunately, torture appears to be a problem which will not likely be resolved until 
China expands its definition of torture to include mental torture and intimidation, and successfully 
establishes a solid rule of law that can provide effective judicial remedies. The CAT, its Special 
Rapporteur, the NGOs and Chinese authorities all agree that while there has been progress since 
China’s accession to the CAT, there is still a gap between China’s commitments under the CAT and 
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the reality on the ground in China (p. 114). The recent 2000 meeting of the CAT seems to show 
little has changed in this regard since the publication of Kent’s book.5 
China and the International Labor Organization 
As Kent points out, China’s relations with the ILO are “more important and sensitive for 
[China] than its relations with any UN human rights body...” given the fact that China’s Communist 
Party is said to have been organized explicitly to advance the rights of China’s workers and peasants 
(p. 118 & 117). The ILO holds UN member-states accountable in the area of economic, social, 
cultural and civil rights as they pertain to occupational groups, focusing particularly on freedom of 
association, the right of collective bargaining, and social welfare programs (p. 117, 118).  
China resumed membership in the ILO in 1971 when it rejoined the UN, but it did not 
participate fully early on, claiming (and winning) exemption because of its status as a poor, 
developing country emerging from the chaos of the cultural revolution. With the crackdowns in 
June, 1989, however, the ILO began to hold China to the same level of accountability as other 
nations, and together with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) pressed 
the Chinese government to account for its actions of June 3 and 4 which led to the death or 
imprisonment of large numbers of workers. Though the ILO was not very strong in its 
condemnation of the government’s actions at Tian’anmen, the ICFTU was, cutting off all contacts 
with China’s state-led All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), which led to the latter’s 
effective removal from the ILO’s governing body in the 1990 ILO session.  
Throughout the 1990s, China continued to deny that universal standards of labor applied to 
China, emphasizing the uniqueness of its historical, social, cultural and economic conditions and the 
need to maintain Party/State authority over labor matters. During the 1990s, with massive layoffs 
stemming from the government’s reform of the state-run sector of the economy, large numbers of 
workers protested, some forming unauthorized labor unions which the government shut down and 
whose leaders it vigorously pursued and arrested. Trade or labor unions existing outside of the 
rubric of the official ACFTU are still considered strictly illegal in China today.  
Although Kent believes learning took place by Chinese participation in the ILO, given its 
acceptance of some ILO standards and the enactment of a new Labor Law in 1994, she believes 
overall that learning was more shallow and instrumental than deep and with conviction (p. 144). 
Noting a learning curve wherein China moved “from overt resistance to procedural compliance,” (p. 
144) she again found a gap between procedural compliance and complete acceptance of ILO 
standards.  
It was clear that, despite the role of ILO standards in providing models for Chinese labor legislation, the 
actual challenge to the leaders’ authority implicit in the existence of genuinely free trade unions in China, 
independent of both Party and state, would not be tolerated by them. (p. 143) 
 Despite huge national economic gains, as it concerns the average worker Kent shows us that 
workers and peasants in China still have a long row to hoe.  
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Conclusion: Compliance, Socialization, and Effectiveness 
Taking the liberal institutionalist view of regimes as her basis, Kent is interested in providing not 
only a documentation of China’s human rights problems and a history of its interaction with the UN 
human rights regime, but an assessment of the ability of international regimes to affect state 
behavior as well. As she notes, China is an important case in this regard because of its size and 
influence, its non-Western values and traditions, and its permanent position on the UN Security 
Council (p. 2). She has determined that measures of compliance (of member-states to treaty/regime 
obligations), socialization or learning (or internalization of treaty/regime norms), and effectiveness (of UN 
organs to monitor the implementation of treaty/regime obligations) are three issues most important 
regarding the ability of the UN human rights regime to affect member-state behavior (p. 1). Her 
conclusions are that while China has become procedurally compliant, and in some cases new laws have 
been enacted to reflect its treaty commitments (e.g., CAT and ILO), overall compliance “on the 
ground” has been poor at best. While China has learned as a result of being a part of the UN human 
rights regime, learning has been more shallow and instrumental than deeply cognitive. Finally, while 
some progress has been made in holding China to higher standards of accountability, in terms of 
effectiveness the UN human rights regime has not been very successful, and “China’s [human rights] 
policies have been more sensitive to domestic than to external pressures...” (p.249).  
Kent’s quote of Convention Against Torture Committee Special Rapporteur Peter Kooijmans in 
his discussion of China’s relation to the Committee seems apropos with regard to its interaction with 
the UN human rights regime as a whole: “All the rules are there but they remain formulas instead of 
living in the minds of men.” (p. 116) This must be held in light of the fact that human rights and the 
rule of law are not easily imposed from above in the course of a decade or two, even when the ruling 
regime has the will to do so. Compliance can only come from true respect for human rights and the 
rule of law, and these must “liv[e] in the minds of men [and women],” meaning not only 
government officials, but judges, law enforcement officials, and citizens as well. They must be 
internalized. This takes time, and while external actors can affect the process, ultimately,  
The cause of human rights violations are largely national...The solutions must also be largely national...Stable 
regimes that over the long run protect internationally recognized human rights almost always have arisen, and 
must arise, from sustained national political struggle and vigilance.6 
Ann Kent’s excellent new book documents both the successful effects of the UN human rights 
regime on China’s human rights behavior, and the failures inherent in a regime that remains a part of 
a UN system based on the sovereignty of nation-states. Kent’s work is a very useful and welcome 
addition to this literature. It would be extremely helpful if this book were updated by the author in 
the form of a new edition every three years or so to keep the reader abreast of new developments in 
the ongoing drama involving China, its people, and the United Nations human rights regime. 
Notes 
1. I reached this conclusion by comparing her statements of China’s positions on pages 159-161, 
169, 181-183 and a few other places (see index listings for universality). 
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2. A purely Marxist view of human rights might be another option, but not one that is talked 
seriously about much in Beijing these days. Moreover, this view too would ultimately have to take a 
stand on whether or not human rights were universal, culturally relative, or developmental (the 
developmental view remains closest to a Marxist frame of thinking, which I believe would have it 
that human rights are a function of class and mode of production or stage of history, that what we 
call human rights are universal but not realizable until after communism’s rise). 
3. Michael Sullivan, “Developmentalism and China’s Human Rights Policy: Should June 4th be 
Forgotten?” Paper presented at the 47th Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies 
(Washington, DC, April 6-9, 1995). 
4. Peter Van Ness, “Addressing the Human Rights Issue in Sino-American Relations,” Journal of 
International Affairs, 49/2 (Winter, 1996): 309-32. 
5. “China Cites Progress on Its Rights Record,” New York Times online edition, May 5, 2000. 
6. Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Crisis, and Humanitarian Intervention,” 
International Journal (Autumn 1993), p. 639-640. 
 
Greg Moore is a doctoral candidate at the University of Denver’s Graduate School of International Studies, focusing 
on international politics, comparative politics and China/East Asia. He is currently writing a dissertation on Sino-
US relations. He also serves as Executive Assistant to the Director of the University of Denver’s Center for China-
U.S. Cooperation.
© 2001 Center On Rights Development 
7
Moore: China’s Cautious Participation in the UN Human Rights Regime
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2001
